Legislative Council, Tuesday 4 November 2025
Ms FORREST (Murchison) – Madam Acting President, first time in the Chair. It’s very good to see you up there.
I am going to make a few direct responses to some of the points that some members have raised, but I’m also going to make some comments that cover more broadly a number of matters that many members have raised. I am trying to address some of those specific matters raised by some members, but rest assured I will get to the other points a little later.
Pretty much everyone has acknowledged we’ve a real problem on our hands. The question we have here is: do we just accept the status quo, which clearly hasn’t addressed the problem or changed the direction of the government, or do we do something additional to add to this that complements the PAC? It doesn’t duplicate; it complements. I will come more to that in a moment.
I do take a little bit of umbrage of the fact the PAC has been partisan because of its membership. The incident referred to – I called it an ‘incident’ – referred to in the Public Accounts Committee, and Madam Acting President, you are a member, as is the member for Pembroke, I don’t think you were at this meeting, which is just not a criticism, I understand the reasons you weren’t there, but there was a bit of that argy bargy. I shut it down within about two minutes in a one-and-a-half to two-hour hearing.
Ms O’Connor – That’s not the only incident.
Ms FORREST – I know it’s not. That was the one that was referenced. We’ve had other episodes when the ministers themselves have tried to and I shut them down, too, because it isn’t the role of the PAC to be playing partisan politics. The PAC has a very important role in scrutinising the expenditure and the effectiveness of the expenditure, of state finances.
While I’m Chair, if people try to play that game, they will be shut down. Sometimes it takes a couple of goes to make sure we do, but in the big scheme of things, out of the amount of time we spend in public-facing scrutiny, the amount of time that partisan politics is on display – because you can’t stop it until it happens – is very, very minimal. You see far more of it on other committees. The minister for Infrastructure had his first fronting to the Public Accounts Committee recently, and I think he will attest there was no politics played in that hearing at all. He’s not listening to me, so maybe he’s not going to confirm or deny it.
In any event, we take our role very seriously on that committee. It is really important work. We shut that down, or I shut it down with support of other committee members, if and when it occurs. I just want to put that out there because it’s a misrepresentation of how the PAC operates. Even in deliberations – and I’m not going to talk about deliberations of a committee –
Ms O’Connor – You misrepresented my observation.
Ms FORREST – If those sort of games are tried, they will be shut down equally quickly. We’ve seen that in this and other committees I’ve been on too.
I am going to touch on the points that were specific that I don’t cover in more detail. I do say the government’s contribution, made by the Leader for the government, contained what I would call a lot of complete nonsense. It absolutely misrepresented the reality and made a number of claims that were simply inaccurate, in my view. Even referring to the Charter Budget Responsibility Act, that is honoured in the breach far more than in the observance of it. To say that those sorts of things are mechanisms that are used, the government just ignores it.
Ms Webb – We should scrutinise that.
Ms FORREST – There does need to be a mechanism that can look into these matters and provide a way forward – or not provide a way forward, because that’s up to the government to actually do the work. However, every committee in this parliament makes recommendations, and many of the recommendations are ignored, as is the government’s right. We can hold them to account for ignoring those recommendations if we wish, but sometimes they adopt them, and I will come to that a bit more fully in a minute.
The member for Elwick rightly said that we do tell the government what to do, by way of motions and all sorts of things. We call on the government do a whole manner of things, and they can adopt, or refuse. Like ministerial diaries ‑ they’ve refused that a number of times, even though we had a motion in this House. Still ignored. We do often tell the government to do things. If you want to talk about the conflation, if you like, with who’s responsible if it goes badly or whatever, every member of this place, almost without exception, has made some sort of request or expressed a view of how the government should do it. We do it in our budget reply speeches, we do it in a whole range of other speeches, and contributions in committees to what we think or what we call on the government to do. Every committee recommendation calls on the government to do something, otherwise it’s not a recommendation.
This bill does not bind the government or the executive in any way. It does not. To say it does is misleading and inaccurate.
I found some of the member for Nelson’s comments quite contradictory, acknowledging the need for more and proper, rigorous scrutiny, but then not taking an opportunity here that provides just that. Talking about needing full clarity on every matter ‑ we just dealt with a motion previously that was identified as not having the full clarity the committee may need. The committee to be established may need to contact the Tasmanian Planning Commission to get further clarity about what they will and won’t cover. We accepted that, and that’s a reasonable expectation. It’s a reasonable thing to do.
This is no different, and if it’s a different mechanism – I’m just making that point, that we don’t always have full clarity on everything. It’s the high‑level principle. There is no overreach into the executive. There is no compulsion for the government to do anything ‑ which is a problem in itself ‑ but that would be overreach, if we said they ‘had’ to take certain actions.
The membership is proposed, and I will touch briefly on this, because I don’t believe we will get into Committee stage. I would hope that we would, to prosecute these amendments, but that’s the will of the House. The committee’s structure is exactly the same as every other committee in the parliament: Public Accounts Committee, Subordinate Legislation Committee, Public Works Committee. The Integrity Committee has some little nuances. Ultimately, and I will speak a bit more about this shortly, but ‑ I think the member for Pembroke spoke about this, about how members are appointed to the committees.
Mr Edmunds – No.
Mr Edmunds – Sorry, yes, I did.
Ms FORREST – We have what I think is a robust process in our House where people who are interested in the committee put their hands up. Then, if there are more members who nominate than there are positions, we have a ballot. How more democratic can you get? I don’t think we should be jumping at shadows and trying to create a whole separate structure for a parliamentary committee that would endure beyond this particular parliament if it does a good job.
I’m just going to make some overarching comments to wrap up. I thank members for their contribution on this bill and wish to address some of the other matters that have been raised broadly during the speeches, and also some raised in the briefings to this bill.
Some have suggested this bill represents an overreach into executive function. Some have claimed it duplicates the Public Accounts Committee, and some have argued it blurs accountability and electoral responsibility. I intend to demonstrate why each of these concerns, while superficially plausible, fundamentally misunderstand both the scope of this bill ‑ particularly if it’s amended as per the amendments I provided last week ‑ and the proper constitutional role of parliament in our Westminster system.
Let me just begin with first principles, because this is where we should focus. Parliament is supreme. One of our crucial roles, perhaps the most crucial role, is to hold the government and executive to account in an open and transparent manner. This is not an optional feature of our democracy ‑ it is its very foundation. When critics claim this bill oversteps into executive territory, they fundamentally misunderstand the constitutional relationship between the parliament and executive in the Westminster system. The executive derives its authority from the parliament. The executive holds power at the parliament’s pleasure. The parliament has not just the right, but the duty to scrutinise how that power is exercised.
The question before us is not whether parliament may hold government accountable for fiscal management. Of course it may. The question is whether parliament should establish better mechanisms to discharge this duty effectively in light of unprecedented fiscal challenges.
Let me address immediately the most specific concern raised, that the bill somehow binds the executive or constrains its legitimate policy direction. The bill as proposed does not bind the government, and the amendments I propose, if we move into committee stage, absolutely clarify this. Where the original bill stated the committee may establish targets, the amendments change this to ‘it may recommend targets’. ‘May’ recommend targets. This is no different to any other committee making recommendations to government to do a certain thing. In fact, during many committee deliberations I’ve been involved in, the committee has recognised that it has the power to recommend to government to take certain actions, whilst being cognisant that it is an action the government is responsible for.
It is absolutely clear the government is responsible for setting fiscal strategies, strategic actions and targets to achieve their fiscal strategies. A committee recommendation related to this area would need to be taken into account, but there is no compulsion at all to adopt any recommendation of the committee.
I hope we have a chance to consider the amendments in the committee stage to clarify that clause 6(1)(c) amendment means the committee may recommend targets in respect of public sector finances.
Clause 6(3) would state: ‘If the committee recommends a target under subsection (1)(c), the Treasurer is to have regard to that target when developing a budget to which the target applies.’ The new subsection 6(5) removes any doubt about this matter, and it would read:
For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this section requires the Treasurer or the government or a statutory authority to comply with, or take any action to comply with, a recommendation made by the committee.
This is the language of parliamentary scrutiny, not executive direction. ‘Have regard to’ is precisely the same language used throughout our existing legislative framework, including the Financial Management Act 2016 itself, which requires the government to have regard to the principles of sound fiscal management. The government remains entirely free to accept, reject, or modify any recommendation. The government is required to consider any recommendation, which I hope occurs with every committee recommendation.
This is accountability, not constraint. This is transparency, not prescription. This is parliamentary oversight, not executive direction.
Some have suggested this model is unprecedented or constitutionally novel. Nothing can be further from the truth. To outline why this is the case, I will go to the member for Hobart’s question about other jurisdictions and other models that are similar. I refer to the Public Works Committee’s function and powers. Section 16 of the Public Works Committee Act 1914 enables that committee to refuse to recommend that a public work proceed. Here is the crucial point: the government cannot proceed with that work without enabling legislation. That committee has enormous powers ‑ they can knock back an approved government project and send it back to the government to say, ‘If you really want do this, you’re going to have to take it to the parliament.’ They can’t say, ‘No, we disagree with that committee, we’re going to do it anyway.’ They can’t. That’s enormous power. No‑one says that’s unconstitutional. The Public Works Committee can effectively block infrastructure projects that involve hundreds of millions of dollars of public expenditure, unless parliament specifically overrides that decision through legislation.
Has anyone suggested the Public Works Committee is unconstitutional? Has anyone claimed it improperly constrains executive discretion? Of course not, because we recognise it is the legitimate parliamentary check on executive spending decisions. Yet critics of this bill, which merely requires government to have regard to recommendations, say it somehow crosses a constitutional line. This comparison I’ve just given reveals the weakness of this argument.
To consider another recent example: the gender and equality committee’s recent inquiry into the Expungement of Historical Offences Bill 2025, and the referral from this House to consider matters related to compensation or redress for men convicted under those historic laws, who have had their historic criminal convictions expunged. The government, by way of proposed amendments in this House, offered $5000 in compensation regardless of the circumstances of the case.
The committee, after due consideration, doing the work that the committee was tasked to do, recommended a scale from $15,000 for men who had been charged but not convicted, or $45,000 for men who had been charged and convicted but hadn’t been subject to prison or aversion therapy or some sort of other inappropriate treatment, to $75,000 for men who had been charged, convicted and subject to imprisonment and other aversion therapy. This was a 15-fold increase from the government’s initial position.
Now, such a recommendation was considered by the government. I had amendments drawn up in this place to proceed with that bill. It could have refused to accept that, especially as it did vary significantly from the government’s stated policy position, which was initially, when first introduced, not to provide any compensation or redress. In this case, the government adopted the committee’s recommendations in full, legislating and giving complete effect to those recommendations, as passed by the House of Assembly some weeks ago, and is now sitting on the table in our House for debate, possibly this week.
Did anyone claim the gender and equality committee overstepped its bounds by recommending a significant increase in expenditure of public funds? Did anyone suggest it improperly interfere with executive budget decisions? No, because we recognise the parliamentary committee’s making recommendations on matters involving public expenditure is entirely normal, appropriate and constitutional. The government has the choice to adopt it or not. In this case, I commend them for adopting it.
If members are generally concerned about separation of powers and proper scrutiny of fiscal policy, let me direct their attention to the far more troubling arrangement: the Treasurer’s budget review panel. This panel currently operates entirely behind closed doors. It has no legislative basis, its deliberations are not public, its recommendations are not disclosed. Members of the parliament on this panel, all from the House of Assembly, meet with the Treasurer to discuss and allegedly influence fiscal strategy without any public scrutiny, parliamentary privilege or an accountability framework.
Talking to some of the members on that panel, they suggest they can’t even test any of the things they’re being told. That’s hearsay because that was from a member of the of the panel. I was informed by a ministerial adviser that the Legislative Council members were excluded from this panel because we are a House of review. Think about the absurdity of that proposition. We are too much of a House of review to participate in reviewing the budget, but, somehow, we would be overstepping by establishing a formal, public accountable committee to do exactly that work.
I’m told this panel is currently working with the Treasurer on a new fiscal strategy and the leader herself alluded to that. One would expect this would include targets and strategic actions to achieve them. If that approach does not constitute encroachment on the role of executive, happening completely behind closed doors with no public or parliamentary scrutiny, how is it possible that the work of this committee, conducted in public, with the reports to parliament in full transparency, could offend the separation of powers? How could it? The hypocrisy is staggering. Critics oppose a transparent, accountable public committee while tolerating an opaque, unaccountable, secret process that actually does shape executive fiscal policy.
Some have suggested that we simply expand the public accounts committee mandate rather than create a new committee. This argument, while superficially appealing, reflects the fundamental misunderstanding of both PAC’s role and this bill’s purpose. Let me be clear: this is not a criticism of the Public Accounts Committee. I would be unlikely to criticise a committee I’m on. Would I, really? But the PAC does vital, excellent work within its established mandate. The question is whether that mandate, or indeed any committee’s mandate, should be stretched to cover fundamentally different oversight functions. That front-end functions, as the member for Launceston alluded to, looking at the bigger picture – the money that’s been spent or appropriated to be spent – but looking at how the whole budget is being managed and trying to look at how the decline in our budget situation can be assessed and considered.
The Public Accounts Committee Act is old, yes; so is the Public Works Committee Act, that’s had a few amendments here and there along the way, but the Public Accounts Committee is focused more retrospectively, taking a reactive approach. If you look at the the inquiries on foot, of which there are seven at the moment – so just a bit on for the PAC – they’re looking at decisions already made and expenditure already committed. It’s a different approach.
If you wanted to expand it out – that was an option I considered, but I made a policy decision, which I’m entitled to do, to make a policy choice here that rather than try and expand the work of the PAC and give the PAC even more to do, with one committee secretary trying to handle all these inquiries we’ve got on foot, two of them references from the lower House – so you can’t say no to those, you have to say yes, which is fine, I’m not not complaining about that, it’s just the reality. There’s seven inquiries on foot; this is a different approach.
It would be far better to have a separate committee looking at it, so you don’t get that blurring and you don’t get that confusion. It is a separate function. The PAC does have broad discretionary powers to examine any matter arising in connection to the public sector finances that the committee considers appropriate, but the discretionary power must be read in the context of the Act’s overall structure and purpose, which is fundamentally retrospective accountability of funds already appropriated and/or spent.
This Budget Accountability and Oversight Committee is fundamentally different: its statutory purpose is to evaluate on an ongoing basis – as opposed to the annual budget scrutiny, for example – the management of public sector finances and assess strategies implemented to ensure fiscal sustainability, and to examine the application of the principles of sound fiscal management.
It can assess forward estimates or look at forward estimates – they’re on public display, they will be on Thursday in the budget – and long-term sustainability in a proactive manner. Similarly, retrospective accountability (the Public Accounts Committee) and prospective sustainability oversight (this bill) are complementary functions, not duplicative; both are necessary. Neither can effectively substitute for the other without blurring the boundaries or roles.
The Public Accounts Committee Act makes no reference whatsoever to the principles of sound fiscal management. These principles are established in the Charter of Budget Responsibility Act 2007. The fiscal principles include: providing for the future of the next generation of Tasmanians, preparing for unexpected events by building a robust financial position, ensuring transparency in accountability and fiscal objectives. I seemed to have dropped a couple off the list. There are a couple others, I seem to have not written them all down, but they’re forward‑focused, looking at future generations, looking to build a robust financial position. That’s the role of this committee; not looking at what has been spent, has it been spent effectively, is it the right expenditure, what’s gone wrong in this project now.
The Charter of Budget Responsibility requires the government’s fiscal strategy to be based on these principles. The Financial Management Act requires agencies to act consistently with them as far as practicable, and requires government to have regard to them. It’s very similar language to what’s in this bill. Yet there is no parliamentary committee with an explicit mandate to hold government accountable for adherence to these principles. If you don’t think those principles are important, I’m not sure why we put them in the act. I was here when we did it. They are critically important and they are future‑focused.
This is an accountability gap that this bill fills. Some argue that the PAC could stretch its mandate to cover this; but if we are concerned about overreach and constitutional propriety, isn’t it far more appropriate to establish a clear, explicit legislative mandate rather than to rely on legislation drafted for different purposes, that being the Public Accounts Committee Act?
The claim that this bill creates duplication reveals misunderstanding of what duplication actually means. Duplication occurs when two bodies perform the same function with the same tools for the same purpose. That’s not what this bill creates. The Public Accounts Committee and the Budget Accounting and Oversight Committee would have different focuses. The PAC looks at the past decisions already made and Budget Oversight Committee the future. They have different subject matters. The PAC is on expenditure propriety, whereas the Budget Accounting and Oversight Committee would look at fiscal sustainability. I could go on, but there’s a number of different matters that clearly outline the differences.
The bill explicitly recognises the potential overlap because both committees will be looking at matters related to the finances of the state and the financial management and that’s addressed in clause 8, and I will just read this.
If the Committee intends to perform a function, or exercise a power, in respect of a matter that is before the Public Accounts Committee, the Committee must first consult with the Public Accounts Committee before performing the function or exercising the power.
That’s not duplication, that’s cooperation and coordination. It ensures both committees worked effectively together without creating a conflict and regardless of whether you have different people on the committees or there were some similar members, the committees as a whole deal with correspondence to a committee. If one committee writes to another, the whole committee considers it. I’ve had a situation just recently on two committees I’m on where we’ve had to write to each other. We haven’t had to but we chose to write to each other.
Mr Gaffney – Did you get a timely response?
Ms FORREST – Still waiting on the response.
Moreover, clause 13 requires the community to consult with the PAC before agreeing from the terms of reference for the statute of review of the Act. This demonstrates the bill’s commitment to cooperation, not competition.
All of this constitutional and structural discussion must be understood in the context of Tasmania’s unprecedented financial crisis. We’re carrying levels of debt unprecedented in our state’s history. Treasury reports consistently show expenditure growth outpacing revenue, forward estimates increasingly unreliable, health demand pressures acknowledged but underfunded. Billions in debt accumulating without credible repayment plans and bailouts for government businesses. A significant deterioration of the government’s financial position has occurred since and despite the existence of The Public Accounts Committee, and it is not a criticism of the committee. The committee’s doing the best job it can, but it demonstrates retrospective scrutiny alone is insufficient when we face such systemic structural fiscal challenges.
Every mechanism available to the department already has been deployed to deal with this challenge. It is not getting any better. Budget debates, Estimates hearings, The Public Accounts Committee investigations, parliamentary questions, Auditor-General report, all those things have not seen the trajectory change. In fact, it’s only got worse. Yet the fiscal position deteriorates. Why? Because none of these mechanisms provide a continuous forward-looking strategic oversight of fiscal sustainability and that’s what this bill is designed to fill that gap.
Budget debates are annual and political in many respects. Estimate hearings are limited in getting to the real underlying challenges. The Public Accounts Committee investigates specific matters after the fact and parliamentary questions receive prepared answers, Auditor-General’s reports – which are valuable – focus primarily on past performance and compliance.
We lack a specific mechanism designed to examine fiscal strategy continuously, to test its assumptions rigorously, to assess the sustainability independently, and to make evidence-based recommendations for improvement. That’s what this bill creates.
The member for Hobart – and maybe the member for Nelson as well ‑ questioned whether other jurisdictions have similar parliamentary committees, particularly those who have the capacity to consider fiscal strategy and make recommendations related to those matters. There are a number of examples I will give of parliamentary committees, not fiscal council, but parliamentary committees where these powers exist. New Zealand is one, close neighbours. Their Finance and Expenditure Committee looks at business related to economic and fiscal policy, taxation, revenue, banking and finance, superannuation, insurance, government expenditure and financial performance and public audit. Clearly, it has the committee to make recommendations in any of those areas. I went to their committee website to read that information.
Then we have a copy of the UK Parliament POST from the UK Parliament. I will just read a few excerpts from this. They’ve looked at this matter. They’re talking about devolved legislatures, talking about Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland. I am quoting from the report:
For example, in Scotland, each select committee puts together a pre-budget report which is sent to the relevant ministers at least six weeks before the budget is published. They state how they think the Scottish government should spend its money over the next year. The Scottish government then responds to its reporting informing the committee as how their reports influence expending plans.
Clearly, a finger in the pie.
Further on, we’re talking about the OECD best practices of parliaments in budgeting. Under the heading of fiscal responsibility:
The legislature should have the opportunity to review and approve the national fiscal framework or major changes to the framework, in particular the fiscal rules and the medium-term budgetary framework. The legislature should examine long-term fiscal sustainability and analysis in order to debate risks faced by society in an open and informed manner and report them to the public.
Then if we go to Canada:
The remit of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance includes undertaking pre-budget consultations with the public regarding recommendations to be made to the Minister for Finance for the next budget.
One could argue that that is overreach if they’re telling the government how to spend the money. The Republic of Ireland:
Part of the committee’s remit is to consider the framework for parliamentary engagement through the budget cycle and make recommendations to –
I’m not sure how you pronounce – Dáil Éireann, the Lower House of the – I will say the Northern Ireland parliament because I can’t pronounce the name of that. I apologise to the Irish for not pronouncing the name of their parliament.
If we go to the United Kingdom:
Among its select committees, U.K. parliament has a treasury select committee which, among other tasks, examines the expenditure, administration and policy of the Treasurer, the government’s economic and finance minister. The Treasury Committee conducts an ex-anti-scrutiny as part of its work. For example, after a budget statement, the Treasury Committee usually conducts an inquiry into the government’s proposals as one aspect of its work. The Treasury Committee secretary consists of a mixture of procedural, economics and finance specialists. The Public Accounts Committee focuses on ex-post-scrutiny, examining government projects, programs and service delivery to consider their value for money.
That makes the distinction there with the U.K., the PAC and the role of the Finance Committee.
Similarly, going back to the Republic of Ireland, the Public Accounts Committee there supports financial scrutiny work alongside its budgetary oversight committee. They have both. They have the public accounts committee and the budgetary oversight committee, which is exactly what this is proposing.
Ms Webb – Not exactly, Ruth. You know that we could have actually –
Mr PRESIDENT – Order.
Ms Webb – If we’d had a process to examine these, then we could’ve thought about it.
Mr PRESIDENT – Order. You can’t talk across the Chamber.
Ms FORREST – Mr President, to suggest there’s not an [inaudible] in other jurisdictions is wrong. I am sorry to speak over you. I apologise, Mr President.
Some have raised concerns about committee experience in the briefings. This is a concern that applies equally to every parliamentary committee. Every member who comes to this place comes from their own background and brings their own experience. Everyone who comes to this place would have a set of skills, not all sets of skills. I don’t have an economics or accounting background. In fact, there’re some people out in the general people who just like to talk a bit about being just a qualified midwife, which is true, I absolutely am. I am not fit to sit on the PAC.
Mr Edmunds – That’s all.
Ms FORREST – That’s all. Yep. I find that quite demeaning. When I did take that consideration of actually being Treasurer in the Labor government should Labor form power, that was the criticism that was thrown at me most. After all, I was just a qualified midwife.
That’s a challenge for any committee, regardless of the subject matter. I am not an energy expert either, but I’m sitting on the energy committee.
In terms of the solution for that challenge – and it is a challenge. I absolutely accept that. The parliament should represent and protect the people. The people have a range of skills. In terms of your evidence gathering, the committee would hear from Treasury officials, economists, industry experts and stakeholders. You seek expert advice where it was needed. The committee may engage external advisers. Other committees do and have done, such as the Energy Matters Committee, which sought expert advice, the Public Accounts Committee has done it in the past, and also there was a previous committee chaired by the member for Mersey on the future gaming markets. The member for Mersey may be able to clarify, they had an expert advisor for that committee as well. That’s how things work, and other parliaments do the same. We also have a very good parliamentary research service. A lot of our committees currently use them quite extensively, including the Public Accounts Committee.
They could be further strengthened: that’s an argument, but that again takes extra resourcing and potentially a future Parliamentary Budget Office. Hopefully that will be established. A PBO would provide technical support, but their job is different. Their job is to cost policies for non‑government members during non‑election periods, and to cost election policies during election periods, and if the legislation is set up in such a way that they can consider committees’ request for information they can do that, but they’re not doing the work of the committee.
The Public Works Committee, the Public Accounts Committee, the Joint Standing Committee on Integrity, and the Subordinate Legislation Committee all deal with complex technical matters, and we don’t suggest that they lack legitimacy because members aren’t engineers, economists, accountants, lawyers or sociologists. We recognise that parliamentary committees gather expertise through their processes. Let me return to the fundamental questions: does parliament have the authority to establish this committee? The answer is unequivocally yes. The parliament has sovereign legislative authority in Tasmania. The parliament has the constitutional power to structure its own committees and the parliament has the responsibility to hold the government to account.
The precedent exists of committees like the Public Works Committee, with far stronger powers, and that’s power over executive decisions. Critics have not identified a single specific constitutional provision in this bill that this bill would violate. They have not pointed to any case law prohibiting such committees. They have not demonstrated any legal impediments to the parliament creating oversight mechanisms of its own design. What is being done is expressing policy concerns under the guise of constitutional parliamentary overreach.
They may believe this committee is unnecessary or unwise or politically problematic, and that may well be the case, but from a policy point of view, you decide whether you agree with the policy position or you don’t. Let me be completely clear about what this bill, particularly as amended, would actually require. It would require the government to have regard to – in other words, consider – any committee recommendations and respond in writing to committee reports within three months. Surely this should be a requirement for all committees.
Members would be aware that this is a requirement of committee reports for GAA and GAB, but many committee secretaries have had to chase responses to these committees for months. One we were chasing for two years, despite our standing orders. It should be legislated, to avoid any doubt about the expectation of parliament that the government should provide a formal response to all committee reports.
To be clear, the government is not required to adopt any recommendation, meet any target, follow any strategy proposed by the committee, or justify its policy choices. This is the bare‑minimum transparency any functional democracy would expect. Government maintains complete discretion over fiscal policy. All this bill does is ensure that discretion is exercised transparently and that the parliament and the community have the opportunity to hold the government to account. If a government cannot defend its fiscal strategy against parliamentary scrutiny, the problem is with the strategy, not the scrutiny.
One of the most important features of this bill is it establishes an opportunity for continuous oversight, not opportunistic investigation. Currently, parliamentary scrutiny of fiscal management is primarily locked into annual budget cycles, the budget released normally in May or June, Estimates hearings occurring over the following weeks, and appropriations bills debated and passed. Twelve months later, the cycle repeats.
The Public Accounts Committee can, does and may follow up with some expenditure decisions, but not regularly overseeing the government’s progress on their budgetary management. Fiscal challenges don’t wait for budget day. Decisions affecting long‑term sustainability are made constantly. There are new spending commitments, changes to revenue assumptions, revisions to the forward estimates, and responses to economic shocks. A committee that meets only in response to specific matters or only during budget sessions cannot effectively scrutinise these ongoing decisions. We need a standing committee with a continuous mandate: exactly what this bill creates.
To ensure that the committee operates as intended, there is the review clause included. I recognise the feedback from the member for Mersey. It was an error that I made, which I appreciate him picking up, that the latest the review should be done is eight years. It can be done after four. The committee needs time to do the work and then be evaluated, at least after four years, but definitely by eight years, and the review needs to be completed in 12 months. This ensures that if the committee becomes ineffective, parliament would have evidence‑based findings to guide reform. Therefore, the committee itself is accountable. Its operations will be scrutinised and assessed, and if it doesn’t deliver value, it can be reformed or abolished.
At its core, this poses a simple question: do we believe Tasmanians deserve transparent, continuous, effective scrutiny of how this government manages public finances? If the answer is yes, this bill is necessary. Some governments may find this scrutiny uncomfortable. Some treasurers may prefer operating without a committee examining their fiscal strategies. Some might prefer the current system, where the Treasury budget review panel operates in secret. Annual budget scrutiny is limited and no committee has a clear mandate to assess the adherence to sound fiscal management principles.
However, comfort for the government is not the standard; accountability to the people is the standard. To me, the choice before this parliament is clear. We can maintain the status quo. That’s what I’m hearing so many members come and argue for: a system where retrospective accountability is strong, but prospective oversight is weak, where annual scrutiny is intensive, but continuous scrutiny and oversight is absent. The Public Accounts Committee does excellent work on what has been spent, but no committee examines whether what the government has planned is sustainable.
Or we can recognise that unprecedented fiscal challenges require enhanced oversight mechanisms, that transparency and accountability are strengthened, not weakened, by clear legislative mandates, and that parliament’s duty to hold government accountable extends to forward‑looking fiscal strategy, not just backward‑looking expenditure review. This bill, particularly if it was proceeded with proposed amendments, is constitutionally sound. It respects the separation of powers by making recommendations, not binding directions. It includes explicit provisions confirming government is not required to comply with recommendations.
This bill is necessary. The deteriorating fiscal position, despite existing mechanisms, demonstrates inadequacy of the current oversight. We need continuous forward‑looking scrutiny, specifically focused on fiscal sustainability. The bill is complementary. It works with, not against, the Public Accounts Committee. It fills a gap. It doesn’t create duplication. The consultation provisions ensure coordination between committees. The bill is accountable. It provides review provisions to assess the committee’s effectiveness and reform it if necessary. The bill is transparent. Unlike the Treasurer’s secret budget panel, this committee would operate in public, table reports in parliament and ensure government responses are on the record.
This bill is proportionate. As amended, it would require the government only to consider the recommendations and explain its decisions: the minimum transparency any democracy would expect. Critics of this bill have raised concerns about overreach, duplication, and constitutional propriety. I’ve addressed all of these concerns in detail and demonstrated why, upon examination, they do not withstand scrutiny. What remains is a simple proposition: that parliament should have a clear, continuous mechanism to scrutinise fiscal sustainability and hold the government accountable for adherence to the principles of sound fiscal management that the parliament itself has established.
We create those principles. We enacted them into law. We require the government to follow them, but we created no committee with an explicit mandate to hold the government accountable for that adherence. This committee is a response to that gap. It is about vital change to make sure the parliament’s fiscal accountability processes catch up and respond to, and reflect, the current fiscal and economic environment.
It is part of the continuous process of reforming and adapting the state’s fiscal management framework. I have no doubt members of this place, whatever their views on particular fiscal policy, share a commitment to transparency, accountability, and responsible fiscal management. This bill advances all three. Members have a choice. Do we support this committee and improve scrutiny and transparent oversight of the government’s fiscal management of the state ‑ a state in the worst fiscal position it’s ever been? Members can choose to support a process that enables open and transparent accountable processes that will build the parliament’s and members’ understanding of the challenges we face, and a process that would also inform the public through public and transparent processes.
Or members can choose to maintain the status quo and hope things improve. The people of Tasmania deserve no less than a parliament that takes seriously its responsibilities to oversee how their money is managed, not just how it was spent yesterday, and whether the plans for spending tomorrow are sustainable.
Mr President, before my final comment, I would also like to acknowledge and thank David Bailey, a former long‑serving Treasury official and former ministerial adviser who has long experience in this space, who has seen about 30 budgets delivered, who has a very deep commitment to effective fiscal management. He supported me in this process. It’s not just some idea that I had. I’ve worked with him and I really appreciate his input, particularly from a Treasury point of view. I would like to acknowledge that. He’s been extremely helpful and I thank him for his commitment for being here today and also attending briefings with me over the past week or so.
Mr President, I commend the bill to the House and I seek member support to support it into the committee stage.
Mr PRESIDENT (Mr Farrell) – The question is that the motion be agreed to.
| The Council divided – | |
| AYES 2 | NOES 10 |
| Ms Forrest | Mr Duigan |
| Ms Thomas (Teller) | Mr Edmunds |
| Mr Gaffney | |
| Mr Harriss | |
| Mr Hiscutt | |
| Ms O’Connor (Teller) | |
| Ms Palmer | |
| Ms Rattray | |
| Mr Vincent | |
| Ms Webb | |
| PAIRS | |
| Ms Armitage | Ms Lovell |
Motion negatived.