Legislative Council, Tuesday 4 November 2025
Ms FORREST (Murchison) – Mr President. I move –
That the bill be now read the second time.
Mr President, this bill is about one thing above all else: it’s about restoring trust and accountability in the way Tasmania manages its public finances. This bill I introduced sits against the backdrop of a deteriorating budget position and increasing government decisions to add to the already high levels of state debt.
Successive warnings from Treasury and independent economists, and from this very parliament’s committees, have been met with delay, denial or cosmetic fixes. We are now carrying levels of debt unprecedented in the state’s history with no credible pathway back to surplus. Servicing that debt will increasingly crowd out our ability to invest in the things Tasmanians need, and need most: hospitals, schools, housing and infrastructure. If we do not act now, we will condemn future governments and future generations to less capacity and fewer choices. This bill is not to cut across other committees, such as the Joint Standing Committee on Public Accounts, but to complement the role of this important committee with a greater focus on the decisions leading into the development of the state budget rather than on the expenditure of public monies after approval of parliament, where the Public Accounts Committee’s crucial work is done.
Members would also note the reference to the role of the Tasmanian Audit Office as a provision to enable the Auditor‑General to report, or provide an opinion, on targets recommended by any relevant report to parliament made by the Auditor‑General. This does not offend any provisions in the Audit Act 2008 in that there is no power to direct the Auditor‑General. Rather, it would enable reporting against targets set or recommended in relation to performance indicators that would assist to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of expenditure by the general government sector or a statutory authority.
The bill seeks to fill a gap in the current assessment and reporting framework to enable the development of measures that are outcomes‑focused and can promote improvement; the efficiency and the effectiveness of expenditure of public money. This would enable agencies and statutory authorities to report data to show a clear link between expenditure of money and outcomes achieved as a result of the expenditure. With the establishment of such measures, these can be reported against and subsequently audited.
Let’s talk about the purpose of the bill. This bill establishes a Parliamentary Standing Committee on Budget Accountability and Oversight. The purpose is clear: to give parliament, and through parliament the people of Tasmania, a stronger, continuous mechanism to evaluate government financial management, test fiscal sustainability strategies, and make recommendation regarding measures to prepare and protect the state’s finances and improve outcomes for Tasmanians. Unlike the annual cycles of budget, revised estimates reports and other financial reports, the committee will provide an ongoing standing framework for scrutiny.
The committee will have a range of functions and powers that are clearly outlined in clause 6 of the bill. In broad terms, the committee will scrutinise budget papers, forward Estimates, agency financial positions and treasurers’ reports.
The committee will also consider the recommendation of targets in respect of steps to be taken by government or a statutory authority, or promote the sustainability of public sector finances. They’ll consider the management of public sector net debt, the measures to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government expenditure.
The committee will have the power to examine, review and report on
- measures taken to achieve fiscal sustainability and other publicly stated fiscal objectives
- measures taken to achieve any publicly stated measure of budget repair and fiscal sustainability
- measures taken to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government expenditure,
- measures taken to ensure the adequacy and stability of sources of revenue for the government,
- the development of the budget and budget papers, and
- the process of parliamentary scrutiny in respect of the budget.
Mr President, the committee will have the power to examine, review and report on existing legislation relating to or impacting on public sector finances. This will be important to identify legislative barriers to open and transparent reporting of matters related to the management of public sector finances.
The committee may consider or report on other strategies to improve the ability of government or a statutory authority to achieve fiscal sustainability, and make recommendations to the government or a statutory authority in respect of any matter that is within the functions of the committee.
The committee may also require, and consider a report upon, any matter referred to the committee by either House of parliament. Following due consideration, if the committee does recommend a target, it would require the Treasurer to take into account those when developing a budget for the relevant financial year. The bill has drafted specified steps to report against, but I have proposed amendments, which I’ll come to shortly, that in broad terms remove that specific reporting requirement.
Furthermore, if the committee does recommend a target, as outlined under section 6(1)(c), the Auditor‑General may ‑ may ‑ in any report or opinion include a statement as to whether, in the opinion of the Auditor‑General, the target was met in a relevant financial year. It will have the power to inform itself in any matter it sees fit. Importantly, the reports will be tabled in parliament, and the government will be required to respond within three months, closing that loop of accountability that’s too often left dangling. The remit is broad enough to ensure the whole state sector can be considered, to ensure a meaningful approach is taken, and avoids consideration of important matters in isolation. It is also important to note that much of the net debt held on behalf of the state sits outside the general government sector.
This committee will not duplicate the work of the Public Accounts Committee. Instead, it will complement and strengthen it, with a sharper focus on budget repair and fiscal sustainability. Where issues overlap, or if they do overlap, consultation will ensure cooperation, not conflict.
The bill provides for review of the act after eight years at a maximum and to be completed within 12 months. Notionally, that would be two full election cycles if we went full term. This will have an amendment to make that possible after four years. I will come to that in a moment.
Before any review commences, the minister and committee must agree on both the person to undertake the review being a person who is appropriately qualified for the task, and the terms of reference for the review.
The committee is to consult with the Public Accounts Committee on these matters before an agreement is reached. There are provisions for consultation should parliament be prorogued at the time that the review is scheduled.
The provisions in Schedule 1 relate to the membership and meetings of the committee and are in line with other joint standing committees, including the Joint Standing Committees on Public Accounts, Subordinate Legislation and Integrity.
I have proposed a number of amendments to respond to matters raised with me after the bill was tabled. I believe these will strengthen its constitutional foundation, clarify the relationships between the committee and government, and address concerns raised during consultation. These amendments fundamentally shift the character of the committee from one that might be perceived as directive to one that is clearly advisory and consultative, whilst maintaining its core purpose of providing continuous fiscal oversight.
The first amendment addresses concerns about the separation of powers by making it crystal‑clear that the committee operates within the transactional Westminster model of parliamentary scrutiny through transparency and accountability, not through command.
The second amendment removes potential ambiguous language that could be interpreted as the committee directing how specific aspects of the financial challenge of the state could be managed, which is, and remains, an executive function. The amendment maintains the committee’s ability to recommend targets, while making it clear it does not dictate how strategies to achieve these targets should be met.
The third amendment addresses concerns about the committee potentially interfering in the legislative process. The committee retains power to examine existing legislation that impacts public sector finances but will not examine bills before the parliament. The committee may still identify needs for legislative reform, and recommend that government consider legislative changes, but it will not review specific bills under development.
The fourth amendment makes a subtle but important change in tone. ‘Strategies to improve’ may imply an assumption that current strategies are inadequate. I’m on the record saying that strategies are generally appropriate. ‘Strategies that may improve’ is more neutral and consultative. The committee examines potential improvements without pre‑judging current approaches. This recognises that the committee’s role is to provide options and analysis, not to presume deficiency.
The fifth amendment is the most significant, substantive amendment. It does three things.
- It changes ‘must take into account’ to ‘have regard to’. This is critical legal language. ‘Have regard to’ is a standard formulation used throughout Tasmanian legislation where a parliament requires consideration without mandating compliance. It appears in the Financial Management Act 2016 itself regarding the principles of sound fiscal management.
- It removes the detailed reporting requirements from subsection 6(3). The original provisions requiring the government to specify in budget papers the steps to reach targets, where the targets will be met, and reasons if not met, have all been removed. This significantly reduces the compliance burden on government while mandating the core accountability mechanism of having to consider, or take into account, the committee recommendations.
- It simplifies and clarifies. The new provision is brief, clear, and consistent with the existing legislative frameworks for parliamentary executive relationships. It clearly removes any doubt as to whether the committee can direct the executive ‑ it clearly cannot.
The sixth amendment creates consistency with the first amendment, it ensures language throughout the clause reflects the committee’s advisory rather than directive role and the amendment applies the provision enabling the Auditor-General to report on whether targets were met, again emphasising that these recommend target, not imposed requirements. The seventh amendment is a belts and braces provision that removes any possible ambiguity about the committee’s powers. It states explicitly, ‘the committee is not required to comply with the committee recommendations, the government is not required to take any action to comply with recommendations’ and this applies to the Treasurer, the government and statutory authorities.
Mr President, I have included this out of an abundance of constitutional caution, with a shift from establish to recommend and the use of have regard to language should make the advisory nature clear. This provision removes any possible argument the committee has a directive power.
The effect this amendment would have is to ensure the government retains complete discretion. It must consider recommendations to have regard to obligation and must respond to committee reports under clause 10(5), but it may lawfully choose not to adopt any recommendation and that choice would not be challenged as unlawful. The provision protects both the committee from claims that exceed its powers and the government from claims its brief statutory obligations by not following recommendations.
The eighth amendment’s key purpose is to enable an earlier possible review by allowing assessment after one parliamentary term for four years rather than two terms – eight years – while still creating it outer limit. The review must commence by year 8. This allows the flexibility and accountability of the committee itself. Parliament can assess effectiveness sooner if needed, but it must do by year 8 at the latest.
Given this is a new oversight mechanism, an earlier review option allows Parliament to assess and adjust if the committee approves ineffective or if unintended consequences did emerge. However, maintaining a minimum four-year period ensures the committee has sufficient time to establish its operations and demonstrate its value before being reviewed. The ninth amendment clarifies that if a review commenced before the 8 years, it must be completed within 12 months, as expected when the bill was presented.
Mr President, these amendments represent careful listening to concerns raised, thoughtful refinement of the bill’s language and a commitment to ensuring the committee operates with the highest constitutional standards. They transform potential weaknesses into strengths. They address legitimate concerns while preserving the bill’s core purpose.
They clarify ambiguities by maintaining robust oversight mechanisms. The bill, if it is amended and proceeds through the process, provides for the committee that can advise on fiscal strategy through evidence-based recommendations, scrutinised fiscal management and continuous oversight, inform Parliament and parliamentary and public debate through transparent reporting and respects executive discretion while demanding executive accountability. This is precisely the balance of a Westminster parliamentary system, and what it should the balance it should strike.
In summary, in conclusion, Mr President, we are long past the point where good intentions are enough. Every recent Treasury report has made it clear the scale of our challenge, expenditure growth consistently outpacing revenue, forward Estimates that are increasingly unreliable, health demand pressures acknowledged but underfunded, and billions in debt piling up without a credible repayment plan. The truth is this. Without structural repair, without discipline and without sustained parliamentary oversight, the problem is likely to deepen. Tasmanians deserve more slogans and pathways to surplus. They deserve evidence that decisions are being tested against clear fiscal principles, whether independent scrutiny applied not just at election time, but at all times.
The bill is not about one party or one government. It is about parliament creating an enduring mechanism to governments of any persuasion to account. Minority government, majority government, coalition or otherwise, the discipline of a standing committee where this mandate will endure beyond the life of a single parliament. Tasmanians know instinctively that our budget challenges are serious. What they want from us is seriousness in response. This bill offers Parliament a way to step up and strengthen oversight work toward the budget repair.
It is not the Parliament’s job to do; it’s the government’s job to do it. It makes accountability continuous, transparent and unavoidable. I commend the bill to the House and urge members to support the second reading of the bill into the committee stage to enable the proposed amendments to be considered.